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Abstract. A system is offered for imitation resistant transmitting of
encrypted information in wireless communication networks on the basis
of redundant residue polynomial codes. The particular feature of this
solution is complexing of methods for cryptographic protection of infor-
mation and multi-character codes that correct errors, and the resulting
structures (crypt-code structures) ensure stable functioning of the in-
formation protection system in the conditions simulating the activity
of the adversary. Such approach also makes it possible to create multi-
dimensional “crypt-code structures” to conduct multi-level monitoring
and veracious restoration of distorted encrypted information. The use of
authentication codes as a means of one of the levels to detect erroneous
blocks in the ciphertext in combination with the redundant residue poly-
nomial codes of deductions makes it possible to decrease the introduced
redundancy and find distorted blocks of the ciphertext to restore them.
Keywords: Cryptographic protection of information · Message authen-
tication code · Redundant residue polynomial codes · Residue number
systems
1 Introduction
The drawback of many modern ciphers used in wireless communication net-
works is the unresolved problem of complex balanced support of traditional
requirements: cryptographic security, imitation resistance and noise stability. It
is paradoxical that the existing ciphers have to be resistant to random interfer-
ence, including the effect of errors multiplication [1–3]. However, such regimes
of encrypting as cipher feedback mode are not only the exception, but, on the
contrary, initiate the process of error multiplication. The existing means to with-
stand imitated actions of the intruder, which are based on forming authentication
codes and the hash-code – only perform the indicator function to determine con-
formity between the transmitted and the received information [1,2,4], and does
not allow restoring the distorted data.
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In some works [5–8] an attempt was made to create the so-called “noise stabil-
ity ciphers”. However, these works only propose partial solutions to the problem
(solving only particular types of errors “insertion”, “falling out” or “erasing”
symbols of the ciphertext etc.), or insufficient knowledge of these ciphers, which
does not allow their practical use.
2 Imitation Resistant Transmitting of Encrypted
Information on the Basis of Crypt-Code Structures
The current strict functional distinction only expects the ciphers to solve the
tasks to ensure the required cryptographic security and imitation resistance,
while methods of interference resistant coding is expected to ensure noise sta-
bility. Such distinction between the essentially inter-related methods to process
information to solve inter-related tasks will decrease the usability of the system
to function in the conditions of destructive actions of the adversary, the purpose
of which is to try to impose on the receiver any (different from the transmitted)
message (imposition at random). At the same time, if these methods are com-
bined, we can obtain both new information “structures” – crypt-code structures,
and a new capability of the system for protected processing of information –
imitation resistance [9], which we consider to be the ability of the system for
restoration of veracious encrypted data in the conditions of simulated actions of
the intruder, as well as unintentional interference.
The synthesis of crypt-code structures is based on the procedure of com-
plexing of block cypher systems and multi-character correcting codes [10–12].
In one of the variants to implement crypt-code structures as a multi-character
correcting code, redundant residue polynomial codes (RRPC) can be used, whose
mathematical means is based on fundamental provisions of the Chinese remain-
der theorem for polynomials (CRT) [13–15].
2.1 Chinese Remainder Theorem for Polynomials and Redundant
Residue Polynomial Codes
Let F [z] be ring of polynomials over some finite field IFq, q = p
s. For some inte-
ger k > 1, let m1(z), m2(z), . . . , mk(z) ∈ F [z] be relatively prime polynomials
sorted by the increasing degrees, i.e. degm1(z) ≤ degm2(z) ≤ . . . ≤ degmk(z),
where degmi(z) is the degree of the polynomial. Let us assume that P (z) =∏k
i=1mi(z). Then the presentation of ϕ will establish mutually univocal con-
formity between polynomials a(z), that do not have a higher degree than P (z)(
deg a(z) < degP (z)
)
, and the sets of residues according to the above-described
system of bases of polynomials (modules):
ϕ : F [z]/(P (z)) →
F [z]/(m1(z)) × . . .×
F [z]/(mk(z)) :
: a(z) 7→ ϕ
(
a(z)
)
:=
(
ϕ1
(
a(z)
)
, ϕ2
(
a(z)
)
, . . . , ϕk
(
a(z)
))
,
where ϕi
(
a(z)
)
:= a(z) mod mi(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k).
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In accordance with the CRT, there is a reverse transformation ϕ−1, that
makes it possible to transfer the set of residues by the system of bases of poly-
nomials to the positional representation:
ϕ−1 : F [z]/(m1(z)) × . . .×
F [z]/(mk(z)) →
F [z]/(P (z)) :
:
(
c1(z), . . . , ck(z)
)
7→ a(z) =
k∑
i=1
ci(z)Bi(z) modd
(
p, P (z)
)
, (1)
where Bi(z) = ki(z)Pi(z) are polynomial orthogonal bases,
ki(z) = P
−1
i (z) mod mi(z), Pi(z) = m1(z)m2(z) . . .mi−1(z)mi+1(z) . . .mk(z)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , k).
Let us also introduce, in addition to the existing number k, the number r of
redundant bases of polynomials while observing the condition of sortednes:
degm1(z) ≤ . . . ≤ degmk(z) ≤ degmk+1(z) ≤ . . . ≤ degmk+r(z), (2)
and
gcd
(
mi(z), mj(z)
)
= 1, (3)
for i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k+ r, then we obtain the expanded RRPC — an array
of the kind:
C :=
(
c1(z), . . . , ck(z), ck+1(z), . . . , cn(z)
)
: ci(z) ≡ a(z) mod mi(z), (4)
where n = k + r, ci(z) ≡ a(z) mod mi(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), a(z) ∈
F [z]/(P (z)).
Elements of the code ci(z) will be called symbols, each of which is the
essence of polynomials from the quotient ring of polynomials over the mod-
ule mi(z) ∈
F [z]/(mi(z)). At the same time, if a(z) 6∈
F [z]/(P (z)), then it is
considered that this combination contains an error. Therefore, the location
of the polynomial a(z) makes it possible to establish if the code combination
a(z) =
(
c1(z), . . . , ck(z), ck+1(z), . . . , cn(z)
)
is allowed or it contains erroneous
symbols.
2.2 Crypt-Code Structures on Based RRPC
Now, the sender-generated message M shall be encrypted and split into blocks
of the fixed length M = {M1‖M2‖ . . . ‖Mk}, where “‖” is the operation of con-
catenation. Introducing a formal variable z number i block of the open text Mi,
we will represent in the polynomial form:
Mi(z) =
s−1∑
j=0
m
(i)
j z
j = m
(i)
s−1z
s−1 + . . .+m
(i)
1 z +m
(i)
0 ,
where m
(i)
j ∈ {0, 1} (i = 1, 2, . . . , k; j = s− 1, s− 2, . . . , 0).
4 Dmitry Samoylenko et al.
In order to obtain the sequence of blocks of the ciphertext Ω1(z), Ω2(z), . . .
. . . , Ωk(z) we need to execute k number of encrypting operations, and to ob-
tain blocks of the open text M1(z), M2(z), . . . , Mk(z), we need to execute k
number of decrypting operations. The procedures of encrypting and decrypting
correspond to the following presentations:
Ω1(z)→ Eκe, 1 : M1(z),
Ω2(z)→ Eκe, 2 : M2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ωk(z)→ Eκe, k : Mk(z);

M1(z)→ Dκd, 1 : M1(z),
M2(z)→ Dκd, 2 : M2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mk(z)→ Dκd, k : Mk(z),
where κe, i, κd, i are keys (general case) for encrypting and decrypting (i =
1, 2, . . . , k); if κe, i = κd, i — the cryptosystem is symmetric, if κe, i 6= κd,i — it
is asymmetric.
We will express the adopted blocks of the ciphertext and blocks of the
open text correspondingly as Ω∗i (z) and M
∗
i (z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k), as they
can contain distortions. The formed blocks of the ciphertext Ωi(z) will be
represented as the minimum residues (deductions) on the pairwise relatively
prime polynomials (bases) mi(z). Here, degΩi(z) < degmi(z). The set of
blocks of the ciphertext Ω1(z), Ω2(z), . . . , Ωk(z) will be represented as a sin-
gle super-block of elements of the RRPC by the system of bases-polynomials
m1(z),m2(z), . . . ,mk(z). In accordance with CRT for the set array of polynomi-
alsm1(z), m2(z), . . . , mk(z), that meet the condition that gcd
(
mi(z), mj(z)
)
=
1, and polynomials Ω1(z), Ω2(z), . . . , Ωk(z), such that degΩi(z) < degmi(z),
the system of congruences
Ω(z) ≡ Ω1(z) mod m1(z),
Ω(z) ≡ Ω2(z) mod m2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω(z) ≡ Ωk(z) mod mk(z)
(5)
has the only one solution Ω(z).
Then, we execute the operation of expansion (Base Expansion) of the RRPC
by introducing r of redundant bases-polynomials mk+1(z), mk+2(z), . . .
. . . , mk+r(z) that meet the condition (2), (3) and obtaining in accordance
with Eq. (4) redundant blocks of data (residues), which we will express
as ωk+1(z), ωk+2(z), . . . , ωn(z) (n = k + r). The combination of “infor-
mational” blocks of the ciphertext and redundant blocks of data form
crypt-code structures identified as a code word of the expanded RRPC:{
Ω1(z), . . . , Ωk(z), ωk+1(z), . . . , ωn(z)
}
RRPC
.
Here, we define a single error of the code word of RRPC as a random distor-
tion of one of the blocks of the ciphertext; correspondingly the b-fold error is de-
fined as a random distortion of b blocks. At the same time, it is known that RRPC
detects b errors, if r ≥ b, and will correct b or less errors, if 2b ≤ r [10, 13, 14].
The adversary, who affects communication channels, intercepts the informa-
tion or simulates false information. At the same time, in order to impose false, as
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applied to the system under consideration, the adversary has to intercept a set
of information blocks of the ciphertext to detect the redundant blocks of data.
In order to eliminate the potential possibility that the adversary may impose
false information, we need to ensure the “mathematical” gap of the procedure
(uninterrupted function) of forming redundant elements of code words of the
RRPC. Moreover, code words of RRPC have to be distributed randomly, i.e.
uniform distribution of code words in the set array of the code has to be ensured.
In order to achieve that, the formed sequence of redundant blocks of data ωj(z)
(j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n) undergoes the procedure of encrypting:
ϑk+1(z)→ Eκe,k+1 : ωk+1(z),
ϑk+2(z)→ Eκe,k+2 : ωk+2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑn(z)→ Eκe,n : ωn(z),
where κe, j (j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n) are the keys for encrypting.
The process of encrypting of redundant symbols of the code word of the
RRPC executes transposition of elements of the vector
{
ωk+1(z), ωk+2(z), . . .
. . . , ωn(z)
}
∈ A onto the formed elements of the vector of redundant encrypted
symbols {ϑk+1(z), ϑk+2(z), . . . , ϑn(z)} ∈ B, where A is the array of blocks of
the ciphertext, B is a finite array.
The operation of transposition excludes the mutually univocal transforma-
tion and prevents the adversary from interfering on the basis of the intercepted
informational super-block of the RRPC (the “informational” constituent) Ωi(z)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , k) by forming a verification sequence ωj(z) (j = k+1, k+2, . . . , n)
for overdriving the protection mechanisms and inserting false information. At the
same time, it is obvious that, for the adversary, the set of keys κe, j and functions
of encrypting Ei(•) of the vector of redundant blocks of data forms a certain
array X of the transformation rules, out of whose many variants, the sender and
the addressee will only use a certain one [4, 16, 17].
We should also note the exclusive character of the operation of encrypting the
sequence of redundant blocks of data, due to this, its implementation requires a
special class of ciphers that do not alter the lengths of blocks of the ciphertext
(endomorphic ones) and not creating distortions (like omissions, replacements
or insertions) of symbols, for example, ciphers of permutation.
3 Imitation Resistant Transmitting of Encrypted
Information on the Basis of Multidimensional
Crypt-Code Structures
A particular feature of the above-described system is the necessity to introduce
redundant encrypted information in accordance with the RRPC characteristics
and specified requirements to the repetition factor of the detected or corrected
distortions in the sent data. The theory of coding tells us of solutions to obtain
6 Dmitry Samoylenko et al.
quite long interference-resistant codes with good correct ability on the basis
of composing shorter codes that allow simpler implementation and are called
composite codes [18]. Such solutions can be the basis for the procedure to create
multidimensional crypt-code structures.
Similarly to the previous solution, the open text M undergoes the pro-
cedure of encrypting. The formed sequence of blocks of the ciphertext
Ω1(z), Ω2(z), . . . , Ωk(z) is split into k2 number of sub-blocks, contain k1 num-
ber of blocks of the ciphertext Ωi(z) in each one and it is expressed in the form
of a matrix W sized k1 × k2:
W =

Ω1, 1(z) Ω1, 2(z) . . . Ω1, k2(z)
Ω2, 1(z) Ω2, 2(z) . . . Ω2, k2(z)
...
...
. . .
...
Ωk1, 1(z) Ωk1, 2(z) . . . Ωk1, k2(z)
 ,
where the columns of the matrixW are sub-blocks made of k1 number of blocks
of the ciphertext Ωi(z).
For each line of the matrix W, redundant blocks of data are formed, for
example, using non-binary codes of Reed-Solomon (code RS [particular case])
over IFq, that allow the 2-nd level of monitoring.
The mathematical means of the RS codes is explained in detail in [19], where
one of the ways to form it is based on the deriving polynomial g(z). In IFq the
minimal polynomial for any element αi is equal to M (i) = z − αi, then, the
polynomial g(z) of the RS code corresponds to the equation:
g(z) =
(
z − αt
)(
z − αt
)
. . .
(
z − αt+2b−1
)
, (6)
where 2b = n− k; usually t = 0 or t = 1.
At the same time, the RS code is cyclic and the procedure of forming the
systematic RS code is described by the equation:
C(z) = U(z)zn−k +R(z), (7)
where U(z) = uk−1z
k−1 + . . . + u1z + u0 informational polynomial, and
{uk−1, . . . , u1, u0} informational code blocks; R(z) = hr−1z
r−1+ . . .+h1z+h0
the residue from dividing the polynomial U(z)zn−k by g(z), a {hr−1, . . . , h1, h0}
the coefficients of the residue. Then the polynomial C(z) = cn−1z
n−1+. . .+c1z+
c0 and, therefore {cn−1, . . . , c1, c0} = {uk−1, . . . , u1, u0, hr−1, . . . , h1, h0} a
code word.
Basing on the primitive irreducible polynomial, setting the characteristic of
the field IFq in accordance with the Eq. (6) a deriving polynomial g(z) of the RS
code is formed.
Blocks of the ciphertext Ωi, 1(z), Ωi, 2(z), . . . , Ωi, k2(z) are elements W ex-
pressed as elements of the sorted array, at the same time a formal variable x is
introduced and a set of “informational” polynomials is formed:
℧i(x) =
k2∑
j=1
(
Ωi, j(z)
)
xj−1 =
(
Ωi, k2(z)
)
xk2−1 + . . .+
(
Ωi, 2(z)
)
x+Ωi, 1(z),
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where i = 1, 2, . . . , k1.
For ℧i(x) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) in accordance with the Eq. (7) a sequence of
residues is formed
Ri(x) =
r2∑
j=1
(
ωi, j(z)
)
xj−1 =
(
ωi, r2(z)
)
xr2−1 + . . .+
(
ωi, 2(z)
)
x+ ωi, 1(z),
where ωi, j(z) are coefficients of the polynomial Ri(x) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) assumed
as redundant blocks of data of the 2-nd level of monitoring; n2 is the length of the
RS code, k2 is the number of “informational” symbols (blocks) of the RS code,
r2 is the number of redundant symbols (blocks) of the RS code; n2 = k2 + r2.
Matrix W with generated redundant blocks of data of the 2-nd level of
monitoring will take the form:
Ψ =
[
Wk1×k2 |Υk1×r2
]
=

k2︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ω1, 1(z) . . . Ω1, k2(z)
r2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ω1, k2+1(z) . . . ω1, n2(z)
Ω2, 1(z) . . . Ω2, k2(z) ω2, k2+1(z) . . . ω2, n2(z)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ωk1, 1(z) . . . Ωk1, k2(z)ωk1, k2+1(z) . . .ωk1, n2(z)

 k1.
The lines of the matrix Υ are redundant blocks of data of the 2-nd level of
monitoring that undergo the procedure of encrypting:
ϑ1, γ(z)→ Eκe1, γ : ω1, γ(z),
ϑ2, γ(z)→ Eκe2, γ : ω2, γ(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑk1, γ(z)→ Eκek1 , γ
: ωk1, γ(z),
where κei, γ (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1; γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2, . . . , n2) are the keys for
encrypting.
The generated sequence of blocks of the redundant ciphertext of the 2-nd
level of monitoring ϑi,k2+1(z), ϑi,k2+2(z), . . . , ϑi,n2(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) form a
matrix V sized k1 × r2 redundant blocks of the ciphertext of the 2-nd level of
monitoring:
V =
 ϑ1, k2+1(z) ϑ1, k2+2(z) . . . ϑ1, n2(z)ϑ2, k2+1(z) ϑ2, k2+2(z) . . . ϑ2, n2(z). . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑk1, k2+1(z) ϑk1, k2+2(z) . . . ϑk1, n2(z)
 .
Now, each column of the matrix W and V as a sequence of blocks
of the ciphertext Ω1, j(z), Ω2, j(z), . . . , Ωk1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) and
ϑ1, γ(z), ϑ2, γ(z), . . . , ϑk1, γ(z) (γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2, . . . , n2) are expressed
in the form of minimal residues on the bases-polynomials mi(z), such that
gcd
(
mi(z), mj(z)
)
= 1 (i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k1). At the same time
degΩi, j(z) < degmi(z), and deg ϑi, γ(z) < degmi(z). Then, as we have noted
above, the arrays of blocks of the ciphertext Ω1, j(z), Ω2, j(z), . . . , Ωk1, j(z)
(j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) and ϑ1, γ(z), ϑ2, γ(z), . . . , ϑk1, γ(z) (γ = k2 + 1, k2 +
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2, . . . , n2) are expressed as united informational super-blocks of RRPC on
the system of bases m1(z),m2(z), . . . ,mk1(z). In accordance with CRT for
the specified array of polynomials m1(z), m2(z), . . . ,mk1(z) that meet the
condition gcd
(
mi(z), mj(z)
)
= 1, polynomials Ω1, j(z), Ω2, j(z), . . . , Ωk1, j(z)
(j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) and ϑ1,γ(z), ϑ2, γ(z), . . . , ϑk1, γ(z) (γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2, . . . , n2)
such that degΩi, j(z) < degmi(z), deg ϑi, γ(z) < degmi(z), the system of con-
gruences (5) will take the form:

Ω1(z) ≡ Ω1, 1(z) mod m1(z),
Ω1(z) ≡ Ω2, 1(z) mod m2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω1(z) ≡ Ωk1, 1(z) mod mk1(z);
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ωk2(z) ≡ Ω1, k2(z) mod m1(z),
Ωk2(z) ≡ Ω2, k2(z) mod m2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ωk2(z) ≡ Ωk1, k2(z) mod mk1(z);
(8)


ϑk2+1(z) ≡ ϑ1, k2+1(z) mod m1(z),
ϑk2+1(z) ≡ ϑ2,k2+1(z) mod m2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑk2+1(z) ≡ ϑk1, k2+1(z) mod mk1(z);
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑn2(z) ≡ ϑ1, n2(z) mod m1(z),
ϑn2(z) ≡ ϑ2, n2(z) mod m2(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑn2(z) ≡ ϑk1, n2(z) mod mk1(z),
(9)
where Ωj(z), ϑγ(z) are the only solutions for j = 1, 2, . . . , k2; γ = k2+1, . . . , n2.
Now, according to the additionally formed r1 redundant bases of polyno-
mials mk1+1(z), mk1+2(z), . . . , mn1(z) (n1 = k1 + r1), meeting the condition
(2), (3) and in accordance with the Eq. (4) redundant blocks of data are
formed, that belong to the 1-st level of monitoring, expressed as ωk1+1, j(z),
ωk1+2, j(z), . . . , ωn1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2), as well as reference blocks of data
ωk1+1, γ(z), ωk1+2, γ(z), . . . , ωn1, γ(z) (γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2 . . . , n2).
The formed redundant blocks of data o the 1-st level of monitoring
ωk1+1, j(z), ωk1+2, j(z), . . . , ωn1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) are encrypted:
ϑk1+1, γ(z)→ Eκek1+1, γ
: ωk1+1, γ(z),
ϑk1+2, γ(z)→ Eκek1+2, γ
: ωk1+2, γ(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑn1, γ(z)→ Eκen1, γ : ωn1, γ(z),
where κeι, γ (ι = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , n1; γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2, . . . , n2) are the keys
for encrypting.
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Now, the arrays of informational blocks of the ciphertext Ω1(z), Ω2(z), . . .
. . . , Ωk(z), blocks of the redundant encrypted text of the 1-st and 2-nd lev-
els of monitoring ϑk1+1, j(z), ϑk1+2, j(z), . . . , ϑn1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) and
ϑi, k2+1(z), ϑi, k2+2(z), . . . , ϑi, n2(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1), as well as reference blocks
of data ωk1+1, γ(z), ωk1+2, γ(z), . . . , ωn1, γ(z) (γ = k2+1, k2+2 . . . , n2) form mul-
tidimensional crypt-code structures, whose matrix representation correspond to
the expression:
Φ =

k2︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ω1, 1(z) . . . Ω1, k2(z)
r2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ϑ1, k2+1(z) . . . ϑ1, n2(z)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ωk1, 1(z) . . . Ωk1, k2(z) ϑk1, k2+1(z) . . . ϑk1, n2(z)
ϑk1+1, 1(z) . . . ϑk1+1, k2(z) ωk1+1, k2+1(z) . . . ωk1+1, n2(z)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ϑn1, 1(z) . . . ϑn1, k2(z) ωn1, k2+1(z) . . . ωn1, n2(z)

 k1 r1
.
The formed multidimensional crypt-code structures correspond to the follow-
ing parameters (a particular case for 2 levels of monitoring):
n = n1n2,
k = k1k2,
r = r1n2 + r2n1 − r1r2,
dmin = dmin1dmin2 ,
where n, k, r, dmin are generalized monitoring parameters; ni, ki, ri, dmini are
parameters of the level of monitoring number i (i = 1, 2) [18].
On the receiving side, multidimensional crypt-code structures undergo the
procedure of reverse transformation. In order to achieve that, the received se-
quence of blocks of the ciphertext Ωi(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k) is split into k2 number
of sub-blocks containing k1 blocks of the ciphertext and expressed in the form of
the matrix W∗ with the parameters identical to the parameters of the sending
side:
W∗ =

Ω∗1, 1(z) Ω
∗
1, 2(z) . . . Ω
∗
1, k2
(z)
Ω∗2, 1(z) Ω
∗
2, 2(z) . . . Ω
∗
2, k2
(z)
...
...
. . .
...
Ω∗k1, 1(z) Ω
∗
k1, 2
(z) . . . Ω∗k1, k2(z)
 ,
where the columns of the matrixW∗ are sub-blocks of k1 blocks of the ciphertext
Ω∗i (z). The arrays of blocks of the redundant ciphertext of the 1-st and 2-
nd levels of monitoring ϑ∗k1+1, j(z), ϑ
∗
k1+2, j
(z), . . . , ϑ∗n1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2),
ϑ∗i, k2+1(z), ϑ
∗
i, k2+2
(z), . . . , ϑ∗i, n2(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) that were obtained in the
parallel process undergo procedure of decrypting:
ω∗k1+1, j(z)→ Dκdk1+1, j
: ϑ∗k1+1, j(z),
ω∗k1+2, j(z)→ Dκdk1+2, j
: ϑ∗k1+2, j(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω∗n1, j(z)→ Dκdn1, j
: ϑ∗n1, j(z);

ω∗1, γ(z)→ Dκd1, γ : ϑ
∗
1, γ(z),
ω∗2, γ(z)→ Dκd2, γ : ϑ
∗
2, γ(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω∗k1, γ(z)→ Dκdk1, γ
: ϑ∗k1, γ(z),
10 Dmitry Samoylenko et al.
where κdι, j and κdi, γ (ι = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , n1; j = 1, 2, . . . , k2),
(i = 1, 2, . . . , k1; γ = k2 + 1, k2 + 2, . . . , n2) are the keys for decrypting.
Now, every column Ω∗1, j(z), Ω
∗
2, j(z), . . . Ω
∗
k1, j
(z) of the matrix W∗ that is
interpreted as an informational super-block of the RRPC is put into the confor-
mity to the sequence of redundant blocks of data of the 1-st level of monitoring
ω∗k1+1, j(z), ω
∗
k1+2, j
(z) . . . , ω∗n1, j(z) (j = 1, 2, . . . , k2) on the bases-polynomials
mi(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n1) resulting in forming the code vector of the expanded
RRPC
{
Ω∗1, j(z), . . . , Ω
∗
k1, j
(z), ω∗k1+1, j(z), . . . , ω
∗
n1, j
(z)
}
RRPC
.
Besides that, the columns of the 2-nd level of monitoring ϑ∗1,γ(z), . . . , ϑ
∗
k1,γ
(z)
are put into the conformity to the reference blocks of data ω∗k1+1,γ(z), . . . , ω
∗
n1,γ
(z)
(γ = k2+1, . . . , n2) on the bases-polynomials mi(z)(i = 1, 2, . . . , n1) and a code
vector of the expanded RRPC
{
ϑ∗1,γ(z), . . . , ϑ
∗
k1,γ
(z), ω∗k1+1,γ(z), . . .
. . . , ω∗n1,γ(z)
}
RRPC
is formed. Then, the procedure is started to detect the
RRPC elements distorted (simulated) by the adversary, basing on the detec-
tion capability conditioned by the equation dmin1 − 1. At the same time, if
Ω∗j (z), ϑ
∗
γ(z) ∈
F [z]/(P (z)), then we assume that there are no distorted blocks of
the ciphertext, where Ω∗j (z), ϑ
∗
γ(z) solution of the comparison system (8), (9) in
accordance with the Eq. (4), for j = 1, 2, . . . , k2; γ = k2 + 1, . . . , n2. Considering
the condition
⌊
(dmin1 − 1)2
−1
⌋
, the procedure of restoring the distorted elements
of RRPC can be executed with the help of calculating the minimal residues or
with any other known method of RRPC decoding.
The corrected (restored) elements number j of the sequence of the ciphertext
blocks Ω∗∗1,j(z), Ω
∗∗
2,j(z), . . . , Ω
∗∗
k1,j
(z) “replace” the distorted number i (of the ci-
phertext blocks) of the lines Ω∗i,1(z), Ω
∗
i,2(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i,k2
(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) of the
matrix W∗. The symbols “**” indicate the stochastic character of restoration.
Now, each line Ω∗i,1(z), Ω
∗
i,2(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i,k2
(z) is put into conformity of the
blocks of the redundant ciphertext of the 2-nd level of monitoring ω∗i,k2+1(z),
ω∗i,k2+2(z), . . . , ω
∗
i,n2
(z) (i = 1, 2, . . . , k1) and code vectors are formed for the
RS code
{
Ω∗i,1(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i,k2
(z), ω∗i,k2+1(z), . . . , ω
∗
i,n2
(z)
}
RS
.
According to the code vectors, polynomials are formed
C∗i (x) = ℧
∗
i (x) +R
∗
i (x) =
k2∑
j=1
(
Ω∗i,j(z)
)
xj−1 +
n2∑
γ=k2+1
(
ω∗i,γ(z)
)
xγ−1
and their values are calculated for the degrees of the primitive element of the
field αℓ :
Si,ℓ = C
∗
i (α
ℓ) =
k2∑
j=1
(
Ω∗i,j(z)
)(
α(j−1)
)ℓ
+
n2∑
γ=k2+1
(
ω∗i,γ(z)
)(
α(γ−1)
)ℓ
,
where i = 1, 2, . . . , k1; ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , r2 − 1, r2 = n2 − k2.
At the same time, if the values of checksums Si,ℓ with α
ℓ for each vector
of the line are equal to zero, then we assume that there are no distortions.
Otherwise, the values Si, 0,Si, 1, . . . ,Si, r2−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k1 are used for
further restoration of the blocks of the ciphertext Ω∗i, 1(z), Ω
∗
i, 2(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i, k2
(z)
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with the help of well-known algorithms for decoding RS codes (of Berlekamp-
Massey, Euclid, Forney and etc.).
The corrected (restored) sequences of redundant blocks of the ciphertext of
the 2-nd level of monitoring ϑ∗∗1,γ(z), . . . , ϑ
∗∗
k1,γ
(z) are subject of the second trans-
formation (decryption) of redundant blocks of the ciphertext of the 2-nd level
of monitoring into redundant blocks of data of the 2-nd level of monitoring
ω∗∗1,γ(z), . . . , ω
∗∗
k1,γ
(z). The redundant blocks of data of the 2-nd level of monitor-
ing ω∗∗1,γ(z), . . . , ω
∗∗
k1,γ
(z) (γ = k2+1, k2+2, . . . , n2) that have been formed again
are used for forming code combinations of the RS code and their decoding.
4 Imitation Resistant Transmitting of Encrypted
Information on the Basis of Crypt-Code Structures and
Authentication Codes
Currently, to detect simulation by the adversary in the communication channel,
an additional encryption regime is used to simulate imitated insertion (form-
ing an authentication code [Message Authentication Code]) [1,2,4]. A drawback
of this method to prevent imitation by the adversary is the lack of possibility
to restore veracious information in the systems for transmitting information.
Complexing the method to protect from imitating of data on the basis of mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) and the above-described solution based on
expanding the RRPC with encrypting the redundant information, it shall make
it possible to overcome the drawback of the known solution. Let us assume that
MAC are formed as usual from the sequence consisting of k2 number of sub-
blocks containing k1 blocks each of the ciphertext Ωi(z) in each one. Then the
procedure of generation of MAC Hi(z) (i = 1, . . . , k1) can be expressed:
H1(z)→ Ih1 : Ω1,
H2(z)→ Ih2 : Ω2,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hk1(z)→ Ihk : Ωk1 ,
where Ihi is the operator of generation of an MAC on the key hi (i = 1, . . . , k1),
Ωi =
{
Ωi,1(z), . . . , Ωi,k2(z)
}
is a vector equation of the super-block of the cipher-
text, k2 is the length of the super-block. Purposeful interfering of the adversary
into the process of transmitting super-blocks of the ciphertext with the MAC
calculated from them can cause their distorting. Correspondingly, on the receiv-
ing side, the super-blocks Ω∗i =
{
Ω∗i,1(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i,k2
(z)
}
of the ciphertext are the
source for calculating MAC:
H˜1(z)→ Ih1 : Ω
∗
1,
H˜2(z)→ Ih2 : Ω
∗
2,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H˜k1(z)→ Ihk : Ω
∗
k1
,
where Ω∗i =
{
Ω∗i,1(z), . . . , Ω
∗
i,k2
(z)
}
is the received super-block of the ciphertext;
H˜i(z) are MAC from the received blocks of the ciphertext, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k1.
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Similarly to the previous solution for restoring the messages simulated by the
adversary from the transmitted sequence of blocks of the ciphertext with MAC{{
Ω1, H1(z)
}
; . . . ;
{
Ωk1 , Hk1(z)
}
;
{
ϑk1+1, Hk1+1(z)
}
; . . . ;
{
ϑn1 , Hn1(z)
}}
RRPC
,
an extended RRPC is formed.
The sub-system of imitation-resistant reception of encrypted information on
the basis of the RRPC and using MAC implements the following algorithm.
Input: the received sequence of vectors of encrypted message blocks with MAC:{{
Ω∗1, H
∗
1 (z)
}
; . . . ;
{
Ω∗k1 , H
∗
k1
(z)
}
;
{
ϑ
∗
k1+1
, H∗k1+1(z)
}
; . . . ;
{
ϑ
∗
n1
, H∗n1(z)
}}
RRPC
.
Output: a corrected (restored) array of super-blocks of the ciphertext
Ω∗∗1 ,Ω
∗∗
2 , . . . ,Ω
∗∗
k1
.
Step 1. Detection of the possible simulation by the adversary in the re-
ceived sequence of blocks of the ciphertext with localization of the number i
row vector with the detected false blocks of the ciphertext, is executed by com-
paring the MAC received from the communication channel H∗1 (z), . . . , H
∗
k1
(z),
H∗k1+1(z), . . . , H
∗
n1
(z) and MAC H˜∗1 (z), . . . , H˜
∗
k1
(z), H˜∗k1+1(z), . . . , H˜
∗
n1
(z) calcu-
lated in the sub-system of data reception. Next, a comparison procedure is per-
formed for all row vectors (i = 1, . . . , k1, k1 + 1, . . . , n1):{
1, if H∗i (z) = H˜i(z);
0, if H∗i (z) 6= H˜i(z).
Step 2. Restoring veracious data by solving the congruences systems:

Ω∗∗1 (z) ≡ Ω
∗
J1, 1
(z) mod mJ1(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω∗∗1 (z) ≡ Ω
∗
Jk1 , 1
(z) mod mJk1 (z),
Ω∗∗1 (z) ≡ ω
∗
Jk1+1, 1
(z) mod mJk1+1(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω∗∗1 (z) ≡ ω
∗
Jn1 , 1
(z) mod mJn1 (z);
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω∗∗k2 (z) ≡ Ω
∗
J1,k2
(z) mod mJ1(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω∗∗k2 (z) ≡ Ω
∗
Jk1 ,k2
(z) mod mJk1 (z),
Ω∗∗k2 (z) ≡ ω
∗
Jk1+1,k2
(z) mod mJk1+1(z),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ω∗∗k2 (z) ≡ ω
∗
Jn1 ,k2
(z) mod mJn1 (z),
(10)
where J1, J2, . . . , Jn1 are row vector numbers, if the comparison result for these
MAC showed absence of distortions in sequence of blocks of the ciphertext
Ω∗j (z) =
{
Ω∗j,1(z), Ω
∗
j,2(z), . . . , Ω
∗
j,k2
(z)
}
. In accordance with the CRT solutions
of systems (10) is the following:
Ω∗∗j = Ω
∗
J1,j
(z)BJ1(z) + . . .+Ω
∗
Jk1 ,j
(z)BJk1 (z) + . . .
. . .+ ω∗Jk1+1,k(z)BJk1+1(z) + . . .+ ω
∗
Jn1 ,k
(z)BJn1 (z) modd
(
p, Pkv (z)
)
,
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where
BJi(z) = kJi(z)Pi(z) are polynomial orthogonal bases; Pkv (z) =
∏
i=1,...,k;
i6=v
mi(z);
v is the number of the detected “distorted” row vector; PJi(z) = Pkv (z)m
−1
i (z);
kJi(z) = P
−1
Ji
(z) mod mJi(z) (j = 1, . . . , k2; i = 1, . . . , n1).
The values of polynomial orthogonal bases are calculated beforehand and are
stored in the memory of the RRPC decoder. Restoring veracious blocks can be
done by calculating the minimal deductions or by any other known method.
In a comparative evaluation of the effectiveness of the methods under consid-
eration for providing imitation resistant transmission of encrypted information,
we will assume that the adversary distorts the ciphertext blocks in the generated
crypt-code structures with probability padv = 2 · 10
−2. Probability padv distor-
tion of each ciphertext block is constant and does not depend on the results of
receiving the preceding elements of crypt-code structures. The probability P (b)
of reception crypt-code structures with b and more errors are presented in the
table 1, in accordance with which a higher recovery power is provided multi-
dimensional crypt-code structures (RRP codes and RS codes). At what at the
given values k1, k2, the closer the matrix being formed Φn1×n2 to the square
shape, the less the level of redundancy introduced.
Table 1. Effectiveness crypt-code structures
Method of construction Structures n k dmin
k
n
P (b)
Crypt-code structures (6, 3, 4) 6 3 4 0.5 0.114158
(RRPC) (8, 4, 5) 8 4 5 0.5 0.010336
Multidimensional crypt-code (6, 3, 4); (11, 5, 7) 66 15 28 0.227 0.000133
structures: (RRPC); (RS) (8, 4, 5); (8, 4, 5) 64 16 25 0.25 0.000106
Multidimensional crypt-code (4, 3, 2); (6, 3, 4) 24 9 8 0.375 0.008862
structures: (MAC); (RRPC) (4, 3, 2); (8, 4, 5) 32 12 10 0.375 0.000802
5 Conclusion
The methods of information protection examined in this article (against simula-
tion by the adversary) are based on the composition of block ciphering system
and multi-character codes that correct errors by forming crypt-code structures
with some redundancy. This redundancy is usually small and it makes it pos-
sible to express all the possible states of the protected information. Forming
multidimensional crypt-code structures with several levels of monitoring makes
it possible to not only detect simulating actions of the intruder but also, if nec-
essary, to restore the distorted encrypted data with the set probability and their
preliminary localization.
14 Dmitry Samoylenko et al.
References
1. Ferguson, N., Schneier, B.: Applied Cryptography. Wiley, New York (2003)
2. Menezes, A.J., Oorschot van P.C., Vanstone, S.A.: Handbook of Applied Cryptog-
raphy. CRC Press (1997)
3. Knudsen, L.R.: Block chaining modes of operation. Reports in Informatics № 207,
Dept. of Informatics, University of Bergen, Norway (2000). October
4. Paar, C., Pelzl, J.: Understanding Cryptography. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
5. McEliece, R.J.: A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory. DSN
Progress Report 42-44, pp. 114–116, JPL, Caltech (1978)
6. Niederreiter, H.: Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory. Prob-
lems of Control and Information Theory, 15(2), 159–166 (1986)
7. Samokhina, M.A.: Modifications of Niederreiter cryptosystems, its cryptographi-
cally strong and practical applications. Papers of the Proceedings of Moscow In-
stitute of Physics and Technology, 1(2), 121–128 (2009)
8. Tilborg van H.: Error-correcting codes and Cryptography. Code-based Cryptogra-
phy Workshop, Eindhoven (2011). May
9. Petlevannyj, A.A., Finko, O.A., Samoylenko, D.V., Dichenko, S.A.: Device for
spoofing resistant coding and decoding information with excessive systematic
codes. RU Patent № 2634201 (2017)
10. Finko, O.A.: Group control of asymmetric cryptosystems using modular arithmetic
methods. In: Papers of the XIV Inter. school-seminar “Synthesis and complexity
of control systems”, pp. 85–87 (2003)
11. Finko, O.A. Samoylenko, D.V.: Designs that monitor errors based on existing cryp-
tographic standards. In: Papers of the VIII Intern. conf. “Discrete models in the
theory of control systems”, pp. 318–320 (2009)
12. Finko, O.A., Dichenko, S.A., Samoylenko, D.V.: Method of secured transmission of
encrypted information over communication channels. RU Patent№ 2620730 (2017)
13. Bossen, D.C., Yau, S.S.: Redundant Residue Polynomial Codes. Information and
control, 13(6), 597–618 (1968)
14. Mandelbaum, D.: On Efficient Burst Correcting Residue Polynomial Codes. Infor-
mation and control, 16(4), 319–330 (1970)
15. Yu, J-H., Loeliger, H-A.: Redundant Residue Polynomial Codes. In: Papers of the
IEEE Int. Symp. Of Inform. Theory Proceed. pp. 1115–1119 (2011)
16. Simmons, G.J.: Authentication Theory/Coding Theory. In: Blakley G.R., Chaum
D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology. CRYPTO 1984. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer, Heidelberg (1985)
17. Zubov, A.Yu.: Authentication codes. Gelios-ARV, Moscow (2017)
18. Bloch, E.L., Zyablov, B.B.: Generalized Concatenated Codes. Sviaz, Moscow
(1976)
19. MacWilliams, F.J., Sloane, N.J.A.: The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes. North-
Holland Mathematical Library (1977)
